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In October 2022, as Rishi Sunak assumed office as British prime minister, he was the fifth consecutive UK leader to occupy the position in six years.

Unleashed on the UK by Britain's EU exit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is occurring in France, now on its sixth premier in 24 months – three of them in the past 10 months?

The current premier, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in return for support from Socialist lawmakers as the cost of his government’s survival.

But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s second-largest economy is locked in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not witnessed for many years – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no easy escape.

Minority Rule

Key background: ever since Macron initiated an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, the nation has had a divided assembly split into three warring blocs – left, far right and his own centrist coalition – none with anything close to a majority.

Simultaneously, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its national debt level and budget shortfall are now nearly double the EU limit, and hard constitutional deadlines to approve a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are approaching.

In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In mid-September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu presented his government team – which proved to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from both supporters and rivals.

So much so that the following day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in modern French history. In a dignified speech, he blamed political intransigence, saying “party loyalties” and “certain egos” would make his job all but impossible.

Another twist in the tale: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a last-ditch effort to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it gently, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, vowing to reject all future administrations unless there were early elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, engaging with all willing listeners. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to prevent a vote. The president’s office confirmed the president would name a fresh premier 48 hours later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the nation's opposing groups were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Could he survive – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a high-stakes speech, the 39-year-old PM spelled out his budget priorities, giving the centre-left Socialist party (PS), who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be frozen until 2027.

With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already supportive, the Socialists said they would not back censorship votes tabled against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those ballots, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, by no means certain to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

Changing Political Culture

The issue is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, similar to the Socialists, the right-leaning parties are themselves split on dealing with the administration – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and longer-term survival – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR seek his removal.

To succeed, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, like his predecessors, toast.

Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly summons up the collective responsibility to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look bleak.

So does an exit exist? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: polls suggest pretty much every party bar the RN would lose seats, but there would still be no clear majority. A fresh premier would confront identical numerical challenges.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After a presidential vote, his replacement would disband the assembly and aim for a legislative majority in the following election. But that, too, is uncertain.

Surveys show the future president will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that French electorate, having elected a far-right president, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

In the end, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its politicians accept the new political reality, which is that clear majorities are a bygone phenomenon, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Numerous observers believe that transformation will not be feasible under the existing governmental framework. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the emergence of governing coalitions common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”